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Abstract
Doubts are raised concerning Rickles’ claim that “an exact analog of the
hole argument can be constructed in the loop representation of quantum
gravity” (Rickles, 2005, 415).
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper in this journal Rickles investigates the extent to which the hole
argument of classical general relativity can be carried over to the formalism of loop
quantum gravity. ¿is is a very worthwhile task. Whether or not one is sympa-
thetic to the presuppositions of the original hole argument, and whether or not one
is sympathetic to the deationary way in which many philosophers have sought to
respond to it, it is hard to deny that our understanding of the interpretative ques-
tions that arise in the context of classical general relativity has greatly benetted
from the hole argument literature. Despite the relative youth and provisional sta-
tus of the approaches to quantum gravity that are being actively pursued, it is high
time that philosophers started asking the same interpretative questions of these
new theories. Investigating if and how the hole argument transfers to the new for-
malisms is one excellent way to do this.
Rickles’ conclusion is that there is indeed an “exact analogue” of the hole argu-
ment for loop quantum gravity. Moreover, just as the classical hole argument fails
to settle the substantivalist–relationalist issue in favour of relationalism, so too the
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issue is not settled in the context of loop quantum gravity, despite the (nominally)
relationalist commitments of themajority of physicists whowork on this approach.
I agree with Rickles that the substantivalist–relationalist debate is not so simply
resolved in the context of loop quantum gravity as the comments of some physi-
cists might suggest. However, I do not agree that anything like the hole argument
can be constructed in the context of its formalism. ¿e key claim in Rickles’ argu-
ment is that “(the quantum analog of) Einstein’s equation cannot determine where
spin-networks are in the manifold. ¿us, for any specication of initial data . . . the
Einstein equation will fail to determine the data at [t A 0]” (Rickles, 2005, 425).
¿is is seriously misleading in as much as it suggests a comparison with the classi-
cal case, where Einstein’s equations do not determine ‘where’ a particular classical
metric eld satisfying the equations is to be situated on the spacetime manifold.
¿e vital dierence is that each such metric eld in a given dieomorphism equiv-
alence class solves the classical equations. In contrast, the spin networks of Rickles’
‘quantumgravitational’ hole argument do not solve the ‘quantum analogues’ of Ein-
stein’s equations. ¿is, as we will see, completely undermines the claim that a hole
argument can be formulated for loop quantum gravity.1 Before elaborating, I wish
to take issue with one or two other claims in Rickles’ paper.
2 ¿e hole argument in classical general relativity
Before seeking to construct a hole argument for spin-networks, Rickles consid-
ers how the hole argument is framed in various formulations of classical general
relativity. A er discussing the argument in terms of the standard spacetime for-
mulation of the theory, he turns to the constrained Hamiltonian formulation.2 Ac-
1In private communication Rickles has pointed out that he views the proper comparison as one
between the spin networks of loop quantum gravity and the 3-metric (of a spacelike hypersurface)
of the Hamiltonian formulation of classical general relativity. But here too the disanalogies serve
to undermine the claim that there can be a hole argument in loop quantum gravity, as I spell out
below (p. 9).
2 I shouldmention onemisleading aspect of Rickles discussion of the hole argument as it applies
to the spacetime formulation of general relativity. He writes:
¿e ‘pullback’ eld ϕg [of a Lorentzian 4-metric eld g] will generally be dierent
in the sense that, given a global chart onM with coordinates xi, ϕg(x) x g(x).
However, it can happen that ϕg = g, i.e. ϕ is a spacetime symmetry for g, even
though ϕg(x) x g(x). When this happens we have the beginnings of a hole ar-
gument: there will be many metrics that solve the equations that will give (locally)
dierent results. (Rickles, 2005, 417)
¿is suggests that only some dieomorphisms ϕ are suitable for constructing the hole argument,
namely those for which ‘ϕg = g’, i.e. those which are ‘spacetime symmetries for g’. But according
to standard notation and terminology, whenever ϕ is a spacetime symmetry, i.e., whenever ϕg = g,
it will also be the case that the coordinate components of g and ϕg are identical relative to every
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cording to Rickles, it is only from the perspective of this formalism that one can
properly appreciate the workings of the hole argument, at least qua a problem of
determinism (418). ¿is is something of an extraordinary claim given that, as for-
mulated by Earman and Norton (1987), and arguably since its very inception, the
hole argument has involved the claim that general relativity, interpreted in certain
way, is radically indeterministic. ¿e way in which this indeterminism is mani-
fest in the spacetime formulation (two models of the eld equations are identical
up to some spacelike surface, but dier to the future of this surface) seems to me
to be no less perspicuous than, and, indeed, manifestly equivalent to, the way in
which it is manifest in the Hamiltonian formalism (two partially overlapping but
divergent curves in the physical phase space both satisfy Hamilton’s equations). In
fact, one might even argue that the spacetime formalism is more illuminating be-
cause it reveals the radical extent of the indeterminism. As Einstein’s original ‘hole’
construction illustrated, and as Earman and Norton stressed, not only does speci-
cation of the metric eld on the manifold up to some spacelike hypersurface fail
to determine the metric properties of any future spacetime points, specication of
the eld on all of the manifold save some compact region as small as you like fails
to determine themetric properties of the points within this region. ¿ere is no tidy
equivalent of this generalization in the Hamiltonian formalism.
As Rickles nicely sets out, the constrained Hamiltonian formulation of general
relativity involves a physical phase space C, the points of which are a 3-dimensional
manifold Σ equipped with a Riemmanian metric qab (the conguration variables),
and a tensor eld pab (the conjugate momenta). ¿e points of C represent possi-
ble spacelike hypersurfaces of generally relativistic spacetimes, qap is the 3-metric
induced on the hypersurface by the spacetime metric, and pab is related to the ex-
trinsic curvature of the hypersurface, as it is embedded in spacetime. Not all math-
ematically possible (qab, pab) pairs are physically possible (in Rickles’ notation, the
space of all mathematically possible pairs is Γ). C is dened by a set of constraint
equations relating qab and pab; the dieomorphism constraintsDa (3 equations per
space-point) and the Hamiltonian constraintHupvdash (1 equation per space-point).
¿e constraints are associated with a set of transformations of C (the gauge
transformations), which induce a partition (the gauge orbits).3 Rickles claims that
coordinate chart (in Rickles’ notation, ϕg(x) = g(x)). ¿e truth is that the dieomorphisms that
are spacetime symmetries are precisely the ones that cannot be used to generate two models that
present the hole dilemma (i.e., models that agree structurally but that dier in terms of which bit
of the structure is exemplied by which part of the manifold). Otherwise the only constraint that
a dieomorphism is required to satisfy if it is to be used in the hole argument is that it reduce to
the identity on some suitable region of the manifold (e.g., all of the manifold to the past of some
spacelike hypersurface). It is also worth noting that for generic (and realistic) solutions to Einstein’s
equations, the only ϕ such that ϕg = g is the identity transformation.
3¿ose not already familiar with the relevant mathematics are recommended to consult Belot
and Earman (2001, §§10.2 and 10.8) before pursuing further references.
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the “relevant constraint for the hole argument is Da since this generates spatial
dieomorphisms of Σ. ¿e gauge motions act on all points of Γ including those
points lying within C, but they have the property of leaving these latter points in-
variant since they generate gauge transformations on C” (Rickles, 2005, 419). Later
he claims that “[t]he treatment of the dieomorphism constraint is the real root of
the hole argument for general relativity” (Rickles, 2005, 424). (He qualies both
of these claims in footnotes, in which he admits that the Hamiltonian constraint
raises an ‘analogous (and deeper) problem’ for time and change.)
It seems to me that in some ways this gets things exactly the wrong way round.
If the question is simply which transformations within the Hamiltonian formal-
ism correspond to the hole dieomorphisms of the spacetime formalism, then the
answer is, in general, that both those generated by the Hamiltonian and dieomor-
phism constraints are needed.4 Perhaps a more interesting approach is to pose the
analogue of the original hole dilemmawithin theHamiltonian framework, without
reference to the spacetime picture, and the ontology it suggests.
If we adopt this approach then supercially there is no dierence between the
transformations generated by the two types of constraint. Both are equally respon-
sible for an apparent breakdown in determinism, because both allow us to trans-
form a curve in C that solves the Hamiltonian version of Einstein’s equations into
another curve which partially overlaps the rst: an innity of mathematically dis-
tinct solutions pass through a given point in C. It is only when one considers how
one should respond to this apparent indeterminism that a dierence between the
two types of constraint, and the related gauge transformations, emerges. ¿e trans-
formations generated by the dieomorphism constraint relate distinct points in C,
but points that are isometric (they dier solely in terms of which points of Σ are
assigned which metric properties).5 A very natural interpretative move, therefore,
4A necessary condition for a spacetime dieomorphism to correspond to a gauge transfor-
mation that is generated purely by the dieomorphism constraint is that it always sends a point
of spacetime to a point that is spacelike related to it. ¿is is not a sucient condition but it at
least indicates the rather recherché nature of those hole dieomorphisms that correspond to a pure
dieomorphism-constraint gauge transformation. Of course, a spacetime dieomorphism’s corre-
sponding to a pure dieomorphism-constraint gauge transformation is also completely foliation de-
pendent. One and the same dieomorphismwill correspond to a dieomorphism-constraint gauge
transformation with respect to one foliation, but to a transformation involving a Hamiltonian-
constraint gauge transformation with respect to another.
5AsRickles states, the transformations generated by the dieomorphism constraints correspond
to dieomorphisms of Σ (there is no need for the qualication ‘spatial’ in this context). But it is not
true that these transformations (or, indeed, those generated by the Hamiltonian constraint) leave
the points of C invariant. ¿ey do not move one out of a gauge orbit, but within a gauge orbit their
action is non trivial. It is only when one passes from C to the so-called reduced phase space, each
point of which corresponds to an entire gauge orbit by construction, that the action of the gauge
transformations becomes trivial. Whereas a generally relativistic spacetime corresponds to a curve
in C, because every such curve lies entirely within a gauge orbit, a generally relativistic spacetime
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is to regard such points as simply mathematically distinct representations of ex-
actly the same physical state, viz. a 3-dimensional space of a particular geometry.
One holds that the further distinctions within the formalism, distinctions which
mark which point of space has which geometrical property, are artifacts which do
not correspond to genuine physical distinctions.
In a sense this exactly parallels a family of responses to the spacetime version
of the hole argument, namely those which, one way or another, claim that all dif-
feomorphic spacetime models represent exactly the same physical state of aairs,
a position well-known in the literature as Leibniz Equivalence. ¿ere are dier-
ences however. One route to Leibniz Equivalence is to question the primitive trans-
model identities of the spacetime points that regarding two dieomorphic models
as distinct requires (see Pooley, forthcoming, §§4–5). In the context of the Hamil-
tonian formalism, our basic points are points of Σ, a 3-dimensional space. It might
seem that taking their repeat appearance in the singlemanifold that underlies every
point of C also involves taking their trans-temporal identity seriously. For example,
consider two initially overlapping curves that solve Hamilton’s equations, and are
related by a transformation generated the dieomorphism constraint. A very liter-
alistic interpretation of the formalism might see these curves as representing two
possible histories of the very same set of persisting spatial points. ¿ese histories
involve exactly the same sequence of geometrical relations being instantiated over
time. ¿e only way they dier (eventually, when the curves diverge) is in terms of
which points instantiate which properties. I hope the absurdity of taking this sort
of interpretation seriously is evident. ¿e fact is that physics provides us with no
reason to postulate persisting, spatial points, let alone ones that can be re-identied
over time entirely independently of the geometrical properties that they instanti-
ate.6
¿etransformations generated by theHamiltonian constraint on the other hand
relate points of C that correspond to dierent hypersurfaces of the same generally
relativistic spacetime. ¿at is, they correspond to dierent 3-geometries. If we seek
corresponds simply to a point of the reduced phase space. All curves in C that lie within the same
gauge orbit correspond to the same spacetime. Each particular curve within a gauge orbit corre-
sponds to a particular foliation of the spacetime by hypersurfaces, and particular coordinatizations
of each spacelike hypersurface.
6It is tempting, therefore, to see the move which identies points of C related by the dieomor-
phism constraint as a less controversial move than the analogous move in the spacetime context.
¿is would be a mistake. ¿e reason is that someone who does not wish to make the identication
in the spacetime context, and who takes the ontology suggested by the spacetime formalism seri-
ously, will obviously notmake the analogous identication in theHamiltonian case either. ¿eywill
regard the spacetime formalism as fundamental, and will interpret the Hamiltonian formalism in
terms of it, i.e., as a way of representing facts about spacetime points rather than persisting spatial
points. Hence they will not identify the relevant points of C even though they regard the identities
of the points of Σ involved in the mathematical denition of the points of C as an artifact.
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to evade the apparent indeterminism in this case by regarding the points related by
transformations generated by the Hamiltonian constraint as representing the same
physical state we are faced with the unpalatable conclusion that the physical state of
the world (i.e. 3-space) does not change over time. ¿is is just, as Rickles acknowl-
edges in the footnotes already cited, one version of the well-known problem time
in canonical general relativity. ¿e point that I wish to make is that this, rather
than anything concerning the transformations generated by the dieomorphism
constraints, is the true heir to the hole argument of the spacetime formalism.
Were it not for the need to construct a quantum theory, I think the solution
would be trivial. One simply has to keep in mind the spacetime perspective, and to
apply the lessons of the spacetime hole argument, to see that curves in C related by
transformations generated by the Hamiltonian constraint are mathematically dis-
tinct representations of the same history, even though the point-by-point pairing
of the two curves by the gauge transformation does not relate physically equiva-
lent instantaneous states. ¿e two alternatives, both of which involve taking the
3-dimensional ontology of the Hamiltonian formalism seriously, appear equally
unattractive: either the indeterminism is genuine, and pernicious, or there really
is no change.7
Before leaving the topic of the classical Hamiltonian framework, I wish tomake
one nal observation about the way in which general relativity diers from some
other ‘generally covariant’, or ‘parametrization invariant’Hamiltonian theories. ¿ere
are two ways in which it might be the case that two curves related by a transfor-
mation generated by a Hamiltonian constraint represent the same physical history
even though the the point-by-point pairing of the two curves by the gauge trans-
formation does not relate physically equivalent instantaneous states. ¿e rst way
involves this being the case even though there is some point-by-point correspon-
dence between the two curves that maps physically equivalent states to physically
equivalent states. ¿is is the scenario that arises in many of the toy models which
are supposed to illustrate the problem of time (for example, Earman, 2002, 8–9). It
is true that there is an apparent indeterminism (because the equations of the the-
ory don’t determine what the physical state will be at any particular time), but it is
equally true that the indeterminism is rather trivial. ¿e sequence of physical states
is completely determined; all that is not determined is ‘when’ each state will occur.
¿e obvious interpretative move to make is to deny the physical meaningfulness of
an external time. (¿e obvious move not to make is to decree that the indetermin-
ism is merely apparent because the transformations generated by the Hamiltonian
constraint are genuine gauge transformations, and thus that the states they relate
7I have previously argued that Barbour’sMachian geometrodynamical interpretation ofGR (see,
e.g., Barbour, 1999, Ch. 11) commits him to the rst of these (Pooley, 2002, 130–3; see also Pooley,
2001, §3.2). ¿eproblemdoes not arise in the conformal generalization of his framework (Anderson
et al., 2003).
6
are really physically equivalent a er all. ¿is way lies the problem of time.)
General relativity diers from these simple theories in an important respect.
Consider a given foliation of a generally relativistic spacetime, and the correspond-
ing curve in C. Now consider foliating the same spacetime by a dierent set of
spacelike hypersurfaces. ¿is will give us a distinct curve in C related to the rst
by a transformation generated by the Hamiltonian constraint. In such a case it is
not just the correspondence under the gauge transformation that does not pair o
physically equivalent states. No such correspondence exists.8 Surely the diculty
of interpreting a quantized version of general relativity, if not the diculty of con-
structing such a theory in the rst place, is predominantly down to this fact.
3 A hole argument for quantum general relativity?
I now turn, nally, to the question of whether anything corresponding to the hole
arguments of classical general relativity can be constructed in the context of loop
quantum gravity. A very brief recap of the details of the theory is needed.
As Rickles discusses (§§3 and 4), loop quantum gravity is a quantization, not of
the Hamiltonian version of general relativity that I have so far discussed, but of an
alternative formulation involving a dierent set of elds on Σ. ¿e old elds (qab
and pab) can be expressed in terms of these new elds. It turns out that the eld
in terms of which qab is expressed is actually the momentum variable of the new
formalism, and that in terms of which pab is expressed is the conguration vari-
able. ¿e physical phase space is dened by analogues of the old dieomorphism
andHamiltonian constraints together with a third family of constraints—theGauss
constraints—that arise because the change of variables involves the introduction of
an additional redundancy.
¿e theory is quantized via Dirac quantization. One starts by considering a
space of (suitably behaved) functionals on the space of connections on Σ. (If one
were working with the old variables, one would be considering functionals on the
space of 3-metrics on Σ.) Very roughly, this space of functionals is the kinematical
state space,K (Rovelli, 2004, 226–42). One then promotes the constraint equations
to operator equations: the physical state space is the space of those states which are
annihilated by (all!) the quantum constraints.
Just as the classical dieomorphism constraint generated transformations that
corresponded to a dieomorphism of Σ, so the quantum operator version is the
generator of transformations in K that correspond to dieomorphisms of Σ. ¿us
if a state is annihilated by the dieomorphism constraint, it is dieomorphism in-
variant.
8For a related discussion, see Wallace (2003).
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We are now in a position to evaluate Rickles’ quantum gravitational hole argu-
ment. He introduces two sets of states: spin-network states SSe and associated s-
knot states Sse. Spin-network states are labelled by certain types of (labelled) graphs
(spin networks) embedded in Σ. ¿eir signicance is that they provide a basis for
a particular subspace of the kinematical state space K, namely the space of states
which satises the (quantum) Gauss constraint. ¿ey do not, in general, satisfy the
dieomorphism constraint (they do, a er all, correspond to embedded graphs). s-
knot states states, on the other hand, correspond to dieomorphism equivalence
classes of spin networks, and thus are annihilated by the dieomorphism constraint
(as well as by the Gauss constraint).
¿ekey feature of classical general relativity (in both its spacetime and itsHamil-
tonian guises) that allows for the hole dilemma is that certain transformations are
symmetries of the theory (they map solutions of the theory onto solutions), even
though they are not (in general) symmetries of the solutions themselves. For ex-
ample, a generic spacetimemodel that is a solution of Einstein’s eld equations will
be mapped, by any spacetime dieomorphism, onto a model that is also a solution.
However, this model will (in general) be a mathematically distinct model. Indeed,
it must be if the hole dilemma is even to arise, for we need two mathematically
distinct models that match in certain respects, and which are both solutions of the
theory, for the spectre of indeterminism even to arise (cf. footnote 2).
It is exactly this feature that is missing from loop quantum gravity. While dif-
feomorphisms of Σ are symmetries of the theory, they are also symmetries of every
(physical) quantum state. ¿at the action of the quantum dieomorphism con-
straint on spin-network states is non-trivial is irrelevant. ¿ese states are not so-
lutions of theory. Only states that are annihilated by both the Gauss and the dif-
feomorphism constraints (and, indeed, the quantumHamiltonian constraint—the
equation requiring this is a version of the infamousWheeler-DeWitt equation) are
solutions of the ‘quantum analogues of Einstein’s equations’. Within the framework
of loop quantum gravity, regarding s-knot states, rather than spin-network states,
as the genuine physical states is not an optional move that one might be persuaded
to take in response to some analogue of the hole argument.9 A quantum theory
which countenances spin-network states as physical states is simply not a quantum
version of general relativity.10
9Of course, the real physical states are actually those superpositions of s-knot states that are
annihilated by the Hamiltonian constraint.
10In fact, the situation I’ve just described bears a close similarity to that involving the classical
and quantummechanics of identical particles. For the very same reasons, pace Stachel (2002), there
is no analogue of the hole argument due to the permutation invariance of non-relativistic quantum
mechanics of indistinguishable particles (see Pooley, forthcoming). But in general it is not the case
that a symmetry of a classical theory becomes a symmetry of the physical states of the corresponding
quantum theory (consider the Galilean covariance of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, or the
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In the last but one paragraph I considered, for the sake of clarity, the spacetime
formulation of the classical theory. As mentioned in footnote 1, Rickles wishes
to compare spin-network states to the 3-metrics of the Hamiltonian formalism of
classical general relativity (and, presumably, to compare s-knot states to points of
superspace—equivalence classes of 3-metrics under 3-dieomorphisms). I should
make it clear why this comparison does not resuscitate Rickles’ claim that a hole
argument can be constructed in loop quantum gravity.
To recap, the apparent indeterminism in classical Hamiltonian general rela-
tivity that is related to the transformations generated by the dieomorphism con-
straint arises in the following way. ¿e equations of the theory allow as solutions
two curves that up to a certain time pass through the same points in phase space but
which then diverge so that one curves passes through one point and the other curve
passes through a distinct point but one that nonetheless involve a 3-metric (and ex-
trinsic curvature tensor) related to that of the rst point by some 3-dieomorphism.
What would be a quantum analogue of this situation? Ignore, for the mo-
ment, issues connected to theHamiltonian constraint. An analogue involving spin-
network states would be a quantum theory that had spin-network states as admissi-
ble instantaneous states andwhich involved evolution equations that, when applied
to a given spin-network state as initial data, allowed as possible but exclusive evolu-
tions both of two spin-network states related by a transformation generated by the
quantum dieomorphism constraint.
Taking account of the timeless associated with the Hamiltonian constraint, the
analogue becomes a theory that allows as solutions (i.e. as physical states) super-
positions of spin-networks that are annihilated by the quantum Hamiltonian con-
straint but that are not annihilated by the quantumdieomorphism constraint. It is
further required that if a given such state is a solution, then any state obtained from
it by transformations generated by the dieomorphism constraint (with dierent
transformations acting on dierent spin-network elements of the superposition)
should also count as a solution.
It might not be clear whether there could be a quantum theory that picked out
just such states as solutions (it would involve an odd kind of indeterministic evo-
lution). It is certainly clear that loop quantum gravity is not such a theory. To
the extent that sense can be made of instantaneous states in the theory, they are s-
knot states, not spin-network states. And to repeat, to be a solution of loop quan-
tum gravity, a state must solve all the constraint equations. Spin-network states
do not. But distinct 3-metrics of the classical theory (together with appropriate
extrinsic curvature tensors) do solve all the classical constraint equations, and dis-
tinct curves passing through such distinct points in phase space can be solutions
Lorentz covariance of relativistic quantum eld theory). ¿is particular dierence between, e.g.,
general covariance and Lorentz covariance merits further investigation.
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of all the classical equations. ¿at is why, in the classical case, it must remain an
optional interpretative move (albeit an obvious one) to regard equivalence classes
of such points as what really correspond to instantaneous states. ¿e correspond-
ing move in loop quantum gravity is already hard-wired into the equations of the
theory.
When it comes to loop quantum gravity and the hole argument, then, we are
not right back where we started. Indeed, without an understanding why there can
be no hole argument in loop quantum gravity, it seems doubtful that progress will
be made in providing a coherent interpretation of the theory’s ontology.11
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